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EMERGENCY ISSUES INVOLVING INDIAN 
COUNTRY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL 
PREPAREDNESS 
By Brian Candelariax 
 
 
The teepee is much better to live in; 
always clean, warm in winter, cool in summer; easy 
to move. 
The white man builds his big house, cost much 
money, like big cage, shut out sun, can never move; 
always sick.  Indians and animals know better how 
to live than white man; nobody can be in good 
health if he does not have all the time fresh air, 
sunshine, and good water. 
--Chief Flying Hawk1 
 
x J.D., Oklahoma City University School of Law (2019); M.L.S., University of 
Oklahoma School of Law (2016). While I am not of American Indian 
Indigenous ancestry, I believe that the fight to maintain the sovereignty of 
American Indian Nations carries with it some universal truths. These truths are 
related to identity, spirituality, and sense of community.  This article represents 
my humble attempt to communicate and better understand some of the lessons I 
have learned. Moreover, I pledge to devote my professional career to 
collaborating with fellow allies of all backgrounds to achieve cultural 
mindfulness through the classroom and the courtroom.  I want to express my 
sincere gratitude to the editors of the AILJ for their suggestions in helping me 
better communicate my message. Any flaws or confusion rest solely upon me, as 
the author of this article. Special thanks go to my colleagues at Oklahoma Indian 
Legal Services, and the many others who have academically and professionally 
mentored me over the years.  However, I save my deepest gratefulness, 
affection, and appreciation for my family and friends, past and present and 
future.  In particular, I wish to thank: my amazing wife, Kathryn Candelaria; my 
mother Gloria Candelaria, my sister Tara Candelaria, my niece Ayla Driskell, 
my brothers-in-law, and the entire Gurule and James families. Their shared 
patience and support made my academic career, and thus this article, possible.    
1 Chief Flying Hawk, as quoted in M.I. MCCREIGHT, FIREWATER AND FORKED 
TONGUES: A SIOUX CHIEF INTERPRETS U.S. HISTORY 61 (Pasadena, California: 




In oda  mode n o ld and i h he e of mode n 
technology, people use electronic devices in a variety of ways.  For 
example, the devices afford users with an opportunity to visualize 
various surroundings that to which they may not otherwise have 
access.  While one of he e i al eali  de ice  i  no  a ailable 
to the author for purposes of this paper, we can use an older 
sometimes under- ili ed fo m of i al eali   the imagination.  
There are a variety of mental images that can be used to guide the 
reader through on the path of gaining knowledge and better 
understanding. Imagine for a moment the following scenarios: 
x It is a quiet spring morning in March. You are 
asleep in your modest little home outside of 
Oso, Washington, when you feel the ground 
shake. You briefly think it is an earthquake 
until you hear the sounds of buildings around 
you being crushed and destroyed.  You look 
out of your bedroom window and see a wall of 
mud tearing through the valley. Pushing and 
dragging houses and vehicles in its wake.  
x It is a stormy spring afternoon in southern 
California. You have been told for a week that 
a severe winter storm may be coming and with 
it a large amount of snow. The day is here and 
so are the storms. The storm comes barreling 
through your town.  As you wait in your home 
for the storm to pass, you wonder what will 
happen when the snow melts and its effect on 
the nearby Lake Henshaw reservoir. In a state 
of disbelief, you wait for the snow to stop. 
x After a particularly devastating summer of 
wildfires and drought in north-central New 
Mexico. It is now raining.  It has been raining 
constantly for days.  You look out the window 
of your home, which your family has owned 
for generations, and see the river outside.  The 
river ordinarily would be a quarter mile from 
the house but now it is only yards away.  You 
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sigh and gather more of your belongings to 
load in your truck while your family members 
unload more sandbags to hold back the river. 
x It is a gorgeous summer day in August. You 
are on a bank of the San Juan River. You are 
about to step into the river, hand-in-hand with 
your grandson, when you notice the water is 
slowly turning a bright orange color that you 
have never before seen in the river.  Perplexed 
and a bit scared you decide that you and your 
grandson should not go into the river today.  
Your grandson turns to you and asks what 
happened.  You tell him you do not know as 
you both stare at the river. 
x Finally, you are on your North Dakota farm 
tending your cattle when you notice that one 
or two members of the herd are acting out of 
the ordinary.  You approach the cows and 
begin thinking about separating them from the 
others so that whatever little bug they have 
does not spread.  A couple days later your 
whole herd is wiped out. It is then you hear 
from your neighbors that it may be anthrax. 
 With those images in mind let us now add to each scenario 
the experiencing these events as a Native American tribe member.  
To whom would you turn prior to each disaster or emergency? To 
whom do you turn as the event is occurring? To whom do you turn 
after the event? As the results of this research paper demonstrate, 
these are not easy questions to answer. Difficulties range from the 
intricacies of federal Indian law, lack of coordination between 
federal, state and tribal agencies, and lack of shared vision for 
preparedness and prevention. This paper will explore why complex 
jurisdictional issues in Indian Country make disasters and 
emergencies, whether they be natural or human-made, extremely 
difficult for tribal authorities to address. 
 To fully illustrate the difficulties facing members of 
federally recognized American Indian Nations and Tribes in these 
situations, this paper is divided into multiple sections to guide the 
reader through the difficult jurisdictional terrain. Part I of this paper 
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will help get the reader familiar with the unique legal relationship 
American Indian Nations have with state and federal governments.  
This paper will first take a detailed, exhaustive look at the evolution 
of federal policie  and applicable legal doc ine .  I  i  he a ho  
objective to assist the reader in better understanding the 
complexities regarding the current status of jurisdictional issues 
involving state, federal, and tribal governments. Part II will explore 
the disaster and emergency assistance program processes. This 
cursory legal background, then, will give the reader a helpful map 
with which the author will discuss past disasters in Indian Country 
in Part III. In Part III of the paper, the author will review examples 
of man-made, as well as natural disasters that have plagued 
American Indian Nations over the course of recent years. In Part IV, 
this paper will address the legal morass of future tensions and 
conflicts towards various paths of possible solutions as American 
Indian Nations prepare their citizens to face future disasters and 
emergencies. The paper will then conclude with a final look at what 
the author has learned over the course of the research and important 
final takeaways the reader should bear in mind regarding this 
subject. 
 
II. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
 
To understand the evolution of Federal Indian Policy it is 
important to establish a groundwork for the discussion to follow. In 
particular, this overview will provide the context with which we will 
survey the legal jurisdictional issues involved in disaster and 
emergency issues in Indian Country. Historically, the Supreme 
Court has attempted to create a set of doctrines for the peaceful co-
existence of the federal, state, and tribal governments.  The success 
of such doctrines can be decided and debated at length, but some 
effects are indisputable and informative. 
 
A.  What is Indian Country? 
 
Before we embark upon the history and background of 
Federal Indian Law, we must first agree upon an important 
definition and concept that will be used and understood throughout 
o  jo ne .  The concep  i  ha  of Indian Co n .  While a 
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helpful way to descriptively unite the American Indian Nations and 
Tribes from through-out the United States, the term also serves as a 
helpf l in od c ion in he ecogni ion  p oce  ha  encap la e  
the rest of our educational voyage.   
 Pe  he Uni ed S a e  Code, [e] cep  a  o he i e p o ided 
in ec ion  1154 and 1156  Indian Co n  efe  o: 
 
 (a) all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United State 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian 
communities within the borders of the United States 
whether within the original or subsequently acquired 
territory thereof, and whether within or without the 
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same.2 
 
By exploring the history of Federal Indian policy, we can add legal 
context to what it means to live in and govern Indian Country.  
 
B. Some History of Federal Indian Policy  
 
A person need not be a student of federal Indian policy to 
realize that imbalances litter the history of Federal-Indian 
interactions. However, these inequities merely expose the 
complexities faced by federal and Native governments alike.  The 
initial interactions between European settlers and Native American 
Tribes represented tentative attempts to establish boundaries based 
upon personal interactions. Depending upon the country of origin, 
colonists treated Native American Tribes with varying degrees of 
respect and esteem.3  As interactions between settlers and Native 
American Tribes increased, so did the need for more formalized 
dialogue that would take the form of treaty negotiations.  The use of 
treaty formation served as an important initial establishment of 
expectations regarding property rights and sovereignty concerns, 
 
2 18 U.S.C. § 1151.  




while also avoiding potential future conflicts.4  Treaties made during 
Colonial, and early Post-Constitutional Eras provide a backdrop for 
the interpretative tools and doctrine that courts would later use to 
sharpen the perimeters to decide future legal disputes. 
It would not be until after the ratification of the United States 
Constitution that a more cohesive strategy would be developed.  The 
United States Congress passed what would be the framework of how 
the country would interact with the Tribal Nations by passing the 
Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790. However, these initial pieces of 
legislation were designed to prevent unlicensed, unauthorized 
purchases of Indian land, whether by individuals or by states.  The 
resulting collision of federal versus state power necessitated the 
emergence of a body that could begin to address some of the initial 
points of conflict that would inevitably involve Native American 
Nations on issues of lands rights, access to resources, and to trade.5  
The United States Supreme Court (hereafter Supreme Court) would 
be that body. The Supreme Court played a vital role in future Federal 
Indian policy interpretation and formation, as the federal judiciary 
laid m ch of he g o nd o k fo  he ubsequent development of 
Indian la  and polic  in he e a ea . 6  
 
C.  Cherokee Cases  and Doctrine Formation 
 
This formative impact began especially true with the early 
Supreme Court rulings of J h  . M I h, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)7, 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)8, and Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)9 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Cherokee Ca e ). The landmark doctrines created by the 
Cherokee cases centered upon the protection of the Indian Nations 
from the state governments by the young, fledgling federal 
government. In other words, the Cherokee Ca e  ep e en ed he 
framework in which the relationship between the Native American 
 
4 Id.  
5 Lind a  G. Robe on, John on . M In o h  in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, as cited in DENNIS W. ARROW, 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: A PRACTICE-ORIENTED CASEBOOK, p. 24 (Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma: Dennis W. Arrow, 2016).  
6 Id. 
7 Johnson . M In o h, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  
8 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
9 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
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and he E opean Se le  (o  In ade , depending pon one  
perspective) would be established and ultimately settled. It is this 
relationship, this framework, this division of duty and responsibility, 
hich p e ail  o hi  da  in Ame ican Indian polic . 10 
The legal foundations established by the Cherokee Cases 
emmed f om Chief J ice Ma hall  in od c ion of a io  
innovative doctrines. The resulting discovery doctrine, the domestic 
dependent nation doctrine, and the trust doctrine all represented 
Ma hall  a emp  o add e  ome of he ini ial i e  ega ding he 
sovereignty of Indian nations. For example, in J h  . M I h, 
Ma hall o gh  o add e  he fundamental land question: what 
real property rights did Europeans acquire, and indigenous people 
lo e, b  i e of he E opean di co e  of Ame ica? 11 To do 
this, he created the discovery doctrine, which resulted in the Native 
American peoples being effec i el  con e ed in o enan  on hei  
land  and denied he igh  o ell hei  lea e  on he open ma ke , 
hile he Uni ed S a e  became hei  landlo d. 12 Next, Chief Justice 
Ma hall  opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia introduced the 
denominated domestic dependent doctrine and the guardian-ward 
relationship doctrine.13 The result of these doctrines was that the 
federal government would be obligated to assume trust duties that 
have proven to be relevant to the subsequent federal-tribal 
interac ion . Finall , he S p eme Co  Worcester v. Georgia 
opinion established that:  
 
Indian nations had always been considered as 
distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time 
immemorial, with the single exception of that 
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them 
from intercourse with any other European potentate 
than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular 
 
10 Rennard Strickland, The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in INDIAN LAW 
STORIES, 62 (Carole Goldberg, ed., New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2011). 
11 Lindsay G. Robertson, The Judicial Conquest of Native America: The Story of 
J h  . M I h, in INDIAN LAW STORIES, 29-30 (Carole Goldberg, ed., New 
York, NY: Foundation Press, 2011). 
12 Id. at 30. 
13 DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: 
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW (Norman, OK.: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2001). 
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region claimed: and this was a restriction which those 
European potentates imposed on themselves, as on 
the Indians. . . . . The Cherokee nation, then, is a 
distinct community occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws 
of Georgia can have no force and which the citizens 
of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent 
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with 
treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole 
intercourse between the United States and this 
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the 
government of the United States.14 
 
Thus, the federal judiciary had now recognized that: (1) American 
Indian Nations possessed only those property rights, those 
abo iginal  p ope  i le , a  ecogni ed b  he fede al 
go e nmen  a  he di co e ing na ion  (a  pe  Johnson v. 
M I h); (2) the relationship between recognized American Indian 
Nations, as denominated domestic dependent nations, and the 
Fede al Go e nmen  a  ha  of g a dian- a d  i h he 
accompanying trust obligations; (as per Cherokee Nation); and (3) 
only the federal government and not state governments would 
con ol he e m  of ade and in e co e  i h Ame ican Indian 
Nations (as per Worcester). These three important foundational 
concepts allowed the Supreme Court to acknowledge the basic, but 
limited, sovereignty of American Indian nations.  
 
D.   The Two Resulting Limitations from the Cherokee Cases 
 
The first limitation derived from the Cherokee Cases was 
that American Indian Nations could not enter into treaty 
negotiations with competing foreign nations.  Established in 
Johnson, this limitation was designed to provide the United States 
with some peace of mind.  In particular, government officials of the 
United States, including those on the Supreme Court, worried that 
American Indian Nations would be tempted to create alliances and, 
maybe more importantly, create constructive economic agreement 
with countries like Great Britain and France. It was feared that if this 
was allowed to happen, the United States would be caught in never 
 
14 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559, 561 (1832). 
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ending military and/or economic warfare that could ultimately lead 
to the possible destruction of the young and fragile nation.15 
 The second limitation on tribal sovereignty resulting from 
the Cherokee Ca e  a  ha  Ame ican Indian na ion  e e 
stripped of their right to freely convey their land to anyone other 
han he U.S. fede al go e nmen . 16 This limitation was also 
designed with United States economic security in mind.  In essence, 
Indian i le a  echnicall  alienable, b  onl  o he go e nmen , 
hich alone co ld e ing i h Indian i le. 17 This limitation was 
f he  amplified b  Chief J ice Ma hall  de c ip ion of 
American Indian proprietary interest as occ panc .  B  de c ibing 
the American Indian Nation property interests in terms of 
occ panc ,  Ma hall  S p eme Co  opinion  opened he a  
for subsequent courts to interpret the doctrines as providing a 
fo nda ion b  hich Ame ican Indian Na ion  igh  of f ee 
alienation was inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the 
Uni ed S a e . 18 
 Despite an apparent attempt to create an approach that 
balanced some recognition of American Indian Nation territorial 
integrity, the Court also recognized ha  he go e nmen  igh  of 
preemption was necessary to prevent the Indians from selling their 
land to citizens of hostile countries, a considerable concern along 
he No h Ame ican f on ie . 19 In the end, the Cherokee Cases  
established two important limits to the exercise of sovereignty by 
American Indian Nations: (1) restricting and prohibiting the ability 
of American Indian Nations to enter into treaties with competing 
foreign nations, and (2) limiting the ability of American Indian 
Nations to freely convey their land to anyone other than the U.S. 
federal government.  By doing so, the Cherokee Cases created a 
foundation of federal case law that future Courts would use to 
address American Indian issues by either advancing or hindering 
American Indian Nation sovereignty. 
 
15 See generally Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: 
Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and their Significance to Treaty-Making 
and Modern Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 
753, 740 (2004).  
16Andrew K. Fletcher, Suffocating Sovereignty: Implicit Divestiture and the 
Violation of First Principles, 5 Dartmouth L.J. 31, 48, at 40 (2007). 
17 Blumm, supra note 16, at 739. 
18 Id. at 740. 




E. Resulting Criminal and Civil Jurisdictional Issues 
 
 As the years passed and some formative legal doctrines had 
been established, the American Indian Nations recognized that when 
issues or conflicts warranted it, they could go the federal court 
system to seek relief. Soon, jurisdictional categories were 
acknowledged in terms of criminal jurisdiction and civil 
jurisdiction.  It also soon became evident that two important factors 
would determine the judicial approach at curing the conflicts  
Indian a  of he land in ol ed and he Indian a  of he 
parties involved. Whether the matter entailed a criminal 
jurisdictional issue or a civil jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court 
began to diversify legal doctrines established by the Cherokee 
Cases.  One of the first cases that approached criminal cases using 
this bifurcated approach was United States v. McBratney20 and was 
later followed by Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 21 and United 
States v. Wheeler.22 The subsequent case of Montana built upon the 
Oliphant approach, leading to a series of civil cases, both regulatory 
and adjudicatory in nature, that would seriously hobble the 
sovereignty of American Indian Nations.  
 
1.  Split-Status Approach for Criminal Cases From 
McBratney to Oliphant and Wheeler   
  
Even prior to the Cherokee cases, the Indian status of the 
perpetrator of a crime and the Indian status of the land involved were 
important factors in determining the jurisdictional venue within 
which the case would be heard.  The United States Congress first 
codified this approach in 1790 with its passage of Indian Country 
Crimes Act.23  This piece of legislation allowed for the federal 
prosecution of non-Indian perpetrators that committed crimes in 
Indian Country.  It was designed as a means of protecting non-Indian 
defendants from the perceived inequality they would face if tried in 
a tribal court.  The Indian Country Crimes Act was later amended in 
 
20 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
21 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
22 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
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1817 to allow for the federal prosecution of crimes involving non-
Indian victims but perpetrated by Indian defendants. It was designed 
as a means of protecting non-Indian victims from a perceived 
indifference by tribal courts. This was the status of criminal 
jurisdiction prior to the Cherokee cases, which did not outwardly 
alter this regime. Thus, following the Worcester case, American 
Indian Nations retained some important jurisdictional powers in the 
sphere of criminal law and civil law within its borders, especially 
over Indian tribe members.  This would begin to change with 
McBratney. 
 In McBratney, the defendant was accused and later 
convicted in a federal court of killing a man on the Ute reservation 
in pre-statehood Colorado.24 Both the defendant and the victim 
shared non-Indian status.  The land upon which the murder occurred 
was considered Indian Country. As per the rationale of the 
Worcester case, the Supreme Court should have found that the 
federal court was indeed the correct venue to try the accused given 
his non-Indian status.  However, the Court found that because of a 
treaty with the Ute Tribe and terms of the enabling statute for the 
state of Colorado, the federal government lacked criminal 
jurisdiction over the crime. The result was that the newly formed 
State of Colorado possessed sole criminal jurisdiction of crimes 
committed by a non-Indian against a non-Indian victim on a theory 
that activities not involving Indians did not impact the concerns or 
interests of the Indian tribes.25 
 While seen for many years as a unique and narrow exception 
based on treaty language, the McBratney opinion nevertheless 
garnered its fair share of critici m. J di h Ro e  opined ha  [ ]he 
absurdity of that theory should be obvious; no other government is 
required to ignore crimes committed within its boundaries between 
non-ci i en . 26 This limited exception was later built upon by the 
opinion in Draper v. United States.27 As in McBratney, the Draper 
Court held that Congressional authority would be crucial  to a new 
a e  ela ion hip i h Indian ibe  i hin i  bo de . In 
particular, the Draper Co  e abli hed ha  if a ne  a e  
 
24 McBratney,104 U.S. at 621. 
25 See Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing 
The Case For Reargument Before The American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 
13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 59, 62 (2003). 
26 Id. 
27 Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). 
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enabling ac  con ained no e cl ion of j i dic ion a  o c ime  
committed on an Indian reservation by others than Indians, or 
against Indians, the state courts were vested with jurisdiction to try 
and p ni h ch c ime . 28 
 Another series of criminal cases which involved the split-
status approach were Ex parte Crow Dog29 and United States v. 
Kagama.30 Decided within a four-year period between McBratney 
and Draper, these two cases added to the structural importance of 
using the split-status approach for assessing criminal jurisdiction.  
Ex parte Crow Dog involved the murder of an Indian chief named 
Spotted Tail by a fellow member of the Lakota tribe, Crow Dog. 
Crow Dog was tried and convicted in the manner dictated by Lakota 
customs and tradition.  However, angered at the perceived leniency 
of C o  Dog  p ni hmen  ( e i ion pa men  of $600.00, eigh  
ho e , and one blanke  o he ic im  famil ), a fede al Indian 
agent had Crow Dog arrested to be tried again in Nebraska State 
Court.  Crow Dog was charged, indicted, convicted, and sentenced 
to death by hanging. Crow Dog appealed his case to the Supreme 
Court. The Court held that the federal government lacked criminal 
jurisdiction because both the victim and the defendant were Indian 
ibe membe  and he c ime occ ed in Indian Co n .  I  i  a 
ca e he e a ho i  and po e  hich eek  o impo e pon hem 
he e ain  of an e e nal and nkno n code,  hich judges 
hem b  a anda d made b  o he , and no  fo  hem, make  no 
allo ance fo  hei  inabili  o nde and i .... 31 The Supreme 
Court found for Crow Dog and set him free. 
 Following the case, an outraged populace pushed Congress 
to pass the Major Crimes Act of 1885.32 The Act placed seven major 
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court system, 
no matter the Indian status of the perpetrator, if the crime was 
committed in Indian Country.33 The crimes were: murder, 
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and 
larceny.34 All other crimes could either be handled in Tribal court or 
 
28 Id. at 242. 
29 Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (historically cited as Ex Parte Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 
556 (1883).   
30 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
31 Id. at 406. 
32 Codified at 18 U.S.C. §1152-1153. 




in state court depending upon the jurisdiction status of the land upon 
which the crime was committed. Soon, the Major Crimes Act 
became a tool for the federal government to successfully assert 
jurisdiction following the Kagama case. The Supreme Court 
concluded in the Kagama case that the Major Crimes Act was 
constitutional despite not involving issues of interstate commerce.  
Instead the Court harkened back to the Cherokee cases and noted 
that as part of its dependent domestic nation status, American Indian 
Nations had to be protected by federal government in the form of 
Congressional plenary power.35  
 
The power of the general government over these 
remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and 
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their 
protection, as well as to the safety of those among 
whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, 
because it never has existed anywhere else; because 
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical 
limits of the United States; because it has never been 
denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on 
all the tribes.36 
 
The result was a case that planted the seed for future limitations of 
Tribal Self-Governance.  
 Admittedly, the Supreme Court had only splinted a power 
that Congress already possessed, pursuant to the Cherokee cases.  
However, the Court had nevertheless created an environment where 
he di co e  of f e limi a ion  co ld be fo nd  and c l ed. 
Continuing with the field of criminal law, the Court would soon find 
those new limitations in the form of the Oliphant case and the 
Wheeler case. 
 Oliphant involved the August 1973 prosecution of two 
defendants accused of assaulting a tribal police officer in the course 
of his duties and resisting arrest.37  The Indian membership status of 
the two defendants was that of non-Indians. Additionally, the crime 
occurred on he S q ami h T ibe  land d ing a ibal celeb a ion 
commemorating Chief Seattle.  The two defendants argued that the 
 
35 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.   
36 Id. at 384-85. 
37 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. 
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Suquamish Indian Provisional Court did not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.38 Before Oliphant, Supreme Court 
precedent suggested that although the federal courts or state courts 
were allowed to prosecute cases involving non-Indian defendants 
for crimes in Indian Country, this jurisdiction was not exclusive. 
Thus, jurisdiction could be maintained by state and federal courts 
and the tribes simultaneously. Departing from this established 
doc ine, he Co  led ha  ac i i ie  i hin a ibe  e i o  ha  
nq e ionabl  impac ed he ibe e e no  i hin he ibe  
a ho i  o add e . 39 The companion case of United States v. 
Wheeler, using the rationale from Oliphant, would soon create a 
destructive set of criteria that would be picked up by future cases. 
 Whee e s contribution to the split-status approach to 
resolving American Indian law issues was ironically an attempt to 
combine the Indian status of the parties with the Indian status of the 
land. The case involved the statutory rape of an Indian minor by a 
member of the Navajo Tribe.40 He was tried and convicted in tribal 
court. However, as in the case of Crow Dog, non-Indian forces 
became outraged and demanded a stiffer sentence than 15 days in 
jail for what amounted to disorderly conduct.41 Wheeler was then 
arrested and indicted for the crime of statutory rape in federal district 
court. At the heart of the case was whether Double Jeopardy 
protections attached.  Wheeler argued that they did.  The Court, 
however, decided otherwise.  The Wheeler Co  held ha  he 
sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal 
offenses clearly does not fall within that part of sovereignty which 
he Indian  implici l  lo  b  i e of hei  dependen  a . 42 In 
a ruling designed to create importance for the companion case of 
Oliphant, he Co  e of implici  di e i e ac ed m ch like a 
scalpel in the hands of a surgeon.  With awkward, artificial 
reasoning, the Court found new harmful limitations to the exercise 
of tribal sovereignty.  The Court held:  
 
The area in which such implicit divestiture of 
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those 
 
38 Id. 
39 Royster, supra note 25, at 63. 
40 Wheeler, supra note 23, at 315-16. 
41 Id. at 315.  
42 Id. at 326. 
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involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers of the tribe.  Thus, Indian tribes can no 
longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they 
occupy. They cannot enter into direct commercial or 
governmental relations with foreign nations. And 
they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts. These 
limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status 
of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is 
necessarily inconsistent with their freedom 
independently to determine their external relations.  
But the powers of self-government, including the 
power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal 
laws, are of a different type. They involve only the 
relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are 
not such powers as would necessarily be lost by 
i e of a ibe  dependen  a .43 
 
Although the case was decided in favor of the Navajo Tribe and the 
Court held that Double Jeopardy did attach, the case undoubtedly 
provided the foundation for the most harmful Supreme Court case 
in recent memory  Montana.  
 
2.  Split-Status Approach for Civil Cases--From Montana 
to Hicks Montana and Its Remedy   
 
³Montana i  he cen e piece of he Co  mode n ake on 
tribal civil juri dic ion o e  nonmembe .  44 The Montana case 
involved the regulatory prohibition of hunting and fishing by non-
Indian members within the reservation borders of the Crow Tribe of 
Montana.45 P e io  o he di co e  of ne  limi a ion  o ibal 
o e eign  fo nd  in Wheeler and Oliphant, civil jurisdictional 
power was held to be within the strict purview of American Indian 
Nations.  Citing the section of the opinion in Wheeler previously 
noted above, the Court held that: 
 
[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, 
the Indian tribes retain their inherent power to 
 
43 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
44 Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633-
647 (2006). 
45 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
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determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic 
relations among members, and to prescribe rules of 
inheritance for members. But exercise of tribal power 
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is 
inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes and 
so cannot survive without express congressional 
delegation.46 
 
The Court then established what would later be known as the 
Montana Rule and also attached two exceptions.  The Montana Rule 
a e  ha  [ ]ho gh Oliphant only determined inherent tribal 
authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied 
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers 
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of 
he ibe. 47 According to the Court, the two concessions given to 
Ame ican Indian Na ion , commonl  kno n a  he Montana 
e cep ion , a e delinea ed a :  
 
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements.  Tribe may also retain 
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its 
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.48 
 
The effect of Montana was the weaponization of the Oliphant and 
Wheeler approach to split-status issues. Decided three years after 
Oliphant, [ ]he Montana e cep ion  held o  hope, al ho gh bai  
is perhaps more accurate of a term, that tribes would continue to 
exercise civil jurisdiction over all persons throughout their 
e i o ie  he e ibal in e e  e e a  ake. 49 In the end, the 
Montana Rule established support of tribal sovereignty only in 
situations where Indian status of the parties involved AND the 
 
46 Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted). 
47 Id. at 565. 
48 Id. at 566. 
49 Royster, supra note 25, at 64. 
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Indian Country status of the land involved must fall within 
American Indian Nations status.50 
 Civil jurisdiction post-Montana: the lasting effects of a 
confused judiciary.  Since Montana[,] the Court has replicated 
that justification for using the member/nonmember distinction in a 
case involving tribal criminal  jurisdiction and has invoked the 
distinction as dicta in cases involving tribal civil jurisdiction as 
ell. 51 This is exemplified in the cases of Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,52 South Dakota v. 
Bourland,53 Atkinson  Trading Co. v. Shirley,54 Strate v. A-1 
Contractors,55 and Nevada v. Hicks.56 All of the cases represent 
concerted efforts to use the split-status approach to whittle away 
American Indian Nation sovereignty.    
 In theory, the Court could have designed M a a  scope 
and effect to be limited in regard to civil jurisdiction.  However, the 
effects of Montana have been the Supreme Court slowly bleeding 
the tribes of their sovereignty.  For example, in Brendale, the Court 
held ha  he Yakima Na ion po e ed inhe en  oning a ho i  
over nonmember-owned parcels located in an area of the reservation 
closed to the general public and dominated by tribally owned and 
member owned parcels, but lacked such authority over nonmember-
owned lands in an area in which nearly half the acreage was owned 
in fee b  nonmembe . 57 The result was a situation where tribal 
authorities had failed to satisfy either of the Montana exceptions.58  
Onl  J ice Ha  Blackm n  di en  demon a ed a na o l  
tailored application of Montana and suggested that the Yakima 
Na ion e ained inhe en  a ho i  o egulate land use by members 
and nonmembers alike throughout the Yakima Reservation because 
he e e ci e of hi  oning a ho i  fell i hin Montana  econd 
exception.59  By doing so, Justice Blackmun appeared to provide a 
 
50 John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes From the 
C he  Ha db  C i g-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731, 776 (May 
2006). 
51 Id. at 743. 
52 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408(1989). 
53 South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679(1993). 
54 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
55 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
56 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
57 LaVelle, supra note 51, at 744-45. 
58 Id. at 745. 
59 Id. at 745-46. 
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workable example of the second Montana exception in practice.  In 
other words, to Blackmun and the two other Justices that agreed with 
him, he Yakima  e e ci e of hi  oning a ho i  a  cen al o 
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe within the 
meaning of Montana  econd e cep ion. 60  I believe that, in the 
end, J ice Blackm n  di en  ep e en ed a en ible pa h f om 
Montana  a path that was ignored and bypassed for the painful 
usage that followed. 
 The Bourland case out of South Dakota represented the 
Co  m ddled applica ion of he Montana general rule.  In fact, 
the court noted that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly treated the 
ibe  mine al, g a ing, and imbe  igh  nde  he Che enne Ri e  
Act as evidence that the taking ""was not a simple conveyance of 
land and all attendant interests in the land," and disagreed with the 
lower court's conclusion that "that "Congress has not abrogated the 
T ibe  p e-e i ing eg la o  a ho i . 61 Instead, the Court held 
ha  Cong e  e plici  e e a ion of ce ain igh  in he aken a ea 
doe  no  ope a e a  an implici  e e a ion of all fo me  igh . 62  
Th , Bourland  minimal commen a  appea ed o po end f he  
de e io a ion of inhe en  ibal po e  nde  he Co  implici  
di e i e app oach. 63 
 The next example of the Court using M a a  confusing 
approach to civil issues, involved a case called Atkinson Trading Co. 
v. Shirley. Here, the issue was the application of a hotel tax on the 
Navajo Reservation and whether the Navajo Nation had the 
authority to levy the tax.64 Proving yet again the Montana 
exceptions were like outdated road maps leading to dangerous 
unknown destinations, the Supreme Court in Atkinson held ha  he 
Na ajo Na ion  ho el occ panc  a  a  applied o nonmembe  on 
non-Indian fee lands could not be justified under either of 
Montana  e cep ion . 65 This was because in the eyes of the Court 
if i  e e o find Montana  fi  e cep ion a i fied b  he 
p o i ion of ibal e ice  he e cep ion o ld allo  he le. 66 
 
60 Id. 
61 Bourland, supra note 54, at 693. 
62 Id.  
63 LaVelle, supra note 51, at 747. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 750. 
66 Id.  
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 Likewise, the court held the tax did not fall within 
M a a  econd e cep ion beca e he co  failed o ee how 
pe i ione  ope a ion of a ho el on non-Indian fee land threatens or 
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
ec i , o  he heal h o  elfa e of he ibe. 67 Atkinson further 
bleeds American Indian Nation sovereignty in the area of civil 
j i dic ion b  ele a ing he h e hold fo  applica ion of he econd 
Montana exception [by] implying that tribal power must be 
nece a  o a e  ca a ophic con eq ence . 68 The Co  
ea oning appea ed o de i e f om i  mi app ehen ion of the use 
of the term imperil in Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes 
& Bands of Yakima Indian Nation. 69 In the end, instead of 
clarifying Montana, Atkinson e ince  a ong end of j dicial 
disapproval of the exercise of tribal governing authority over 
nonmembers on non-Indian land  i hin e e a ion bo nda ie . 70 
 De pi e an nb oken ing of mode n e a S p eme Co  
cases, beginning in 1959 with Williams v. Lee, in which the court 
con i en l  affi med ibal co  inhe en  sovereign authority over 
the conduct of all persons including non-Indians, within reservation 
bo nda ie , 71 the court struggled to maintain a healthier more 
cohesive approach.  Instead, as the case of Strate v. A-1 Contractors 
demonstrated, the Court diminished the Montana exceptions and 
extended Montana  gene al le of he p e mp ion again  
inherent tribal governing authority over nonmembers to include: 
(1) ibal adj dica i e j i dic ion a  ell a  legi la i e j i dic ion, 
and (2) conduct on state highways as well non-Indian fee land . 72  
 Finally, the case of Nevada v. Hicks represented the natural 
extension of the Montana decision.  Nevada v. Hicks involved a 
ibal membe  ca e of ac ion in Fallon Pai e-Shoshone Tribal 
court against Nevada game wardens, arguing that the Nevada game 
wardens had committed various civil offenses under tribal law and 
had al o iola ed Hick  fede al ci il igh  nde  42 U.S.C. 1983 
by illegally searching his on-reservation property for evidence of an 
off-reservation crime. In its opinion, the Supreme Court held that 
ibal co  lack j i dic ion o e  a e official  fo  ca e  of 
 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 751. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 752. 
71 Id. at 755.  
72 Id. at 758. 
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ac ion ela ing o hei  pe fo mance of official d ie . 73 The 
Co  opinion ep e en ed an np eceden ed applica ion of he 
Montana test to an assertion of tribal authority over the conduct of 
nonmembers occurring with reservation boundaries on land 
belonging o a ibal membe . 74 
 
 3. Why Understanding Jurisdiction Issues is So Important 
  
As the reader can now see, the tangle of criminal and civil 
jurisdictional issues has understandably left tribe and non-tribe 
members alike lost and confused during times and situations when 
affected individuals can least afford it. As discussed in the previous 
ec ion , he S p eme Co  Montana decision has muddled the 
landscape of civil regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction.  This is 
never more apparent than when discussing the effects of disasters in 
Indian Country  especially those that are man-made.  At the core 
of these difficulties is the fact that tribes are left with very few 
legislative legal tools by which tribes can criminally punish evil-
doers and civilly recover damages from negligent actors.  It is 
important for tribes to be able to act hen di cha ge  of ha a do  
substances and other pollutants result in injuries to these natural 
resources and natural resource services, impairing the important 
ecological and economic f nc ion  ha  he  p o ide. 75 In order to 
better understand how detrimental these jurisdictional quagmires 
can be at times of disaster and emergency, let us now look back to 
some examples of past disasters, natural and man-made, that 
occurred in Indian Country.  
 
III. A BASIC HISTORY OF FEDERAL APPROACH TO DISASTERS AND 
EMERGENCIES IN AMERICA 
 
Before continuing with an analysis of past disasters let us 
first understand some key concepts regarding federal disaster relief 
and recovery resources. On April 1, 1979, President Jimmy Carter 
created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the 
 
73 Hicks, supra note 57. at 369.  
74 LaVelle, supra note 51. at 759. 
75 Allan Kanner, Tribal Sovereignty and Natural Resource Damages, 25 PUB. 
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 93, 93 (2004). 
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na ion  ingle dome ic agenc  en ed o managing he 
Na ion  di a e . 76 Al ho gh no  he fede al go e nmen  fi  
in ol emen  in eme genc  managemen ,  ince i  1979 incep ion 
and p o 2010, FEMA had coo dina ed Fede al e pon e and 
recovery efforts and supported state, tribal, and local efforts in more 
han 1,800 inciden . 77  In 1988, Congress passed the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act78 and then 
the Homeland Security Act of 200279 (following the tragedy of the 
September 11th attacks in 2001) to act as the legislative foundations 
upon which FEMA derives its core mission.  That mission was 
modified when, following the passage of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, FEMA was consolidated to become an agency within the 
Department of Homeland Security and not an independent agency 
a  i  once had been.  A  a e l , FEMA a  a ked o lead he 
coordination of efforts across the Federal Government to support its 
partners in the Federal, State, Tribal and local government and 
p i a e ec o  o enhance he Na ion  p epa edne  o p e en , 
protect against, respond to recover from, and mitigate all hazards. 80 
 FEMA accomplishes its mission by providing affected 
citizens with assistance in response and recovery from a variety of 
events.  Using the National Response Framework (NRF) and 
National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), FEMA can help 
a e , ibe  and local go e nmen  coo dina e e o ce  f om one 
another, the Federal Government, voluntary, non-profit and private 
ec o  agencie  ega dle  of an e en  i e, cale, o  he he  i  
ecei e  a P e iden ial decla a ion. 81 Additionally, FEMA can 
coordinate communities with federal support from agencies like the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), Department of Health and Human Services 
 
76 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PUBL'N 1, p. 33 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. 
(Nov. 2010)), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691144 
[https://perma.cc/6EQL-XVER].  
77 Id.  
78 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
5121 (1988) (hereinafter Stafford Act). 
79 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).  
80 FEMA PUBL'N 1, supra note 77, at 20.  
81 Erin J. Greten & Ernest B. Abbott, Representing States, Tribes, and Local 
Governments Before, During, and After a Presidentially -Declared Disaster, 48 
URB. LAW. 489, 492 (2016). 
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(HHS) , Department of Defense (DOD), and many others.82 Both 
categorizations carry important legal duties and responsibilities 
which FEMA is, in turn, expected to provide for affected geographic 
populations and government agencies The Stafford Act defines an 
eme genc  a : 
 
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is 
needed to supplement State and local efforts and 
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and 
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the 
threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United 
States. 
 
 Addi ionall , he S affo d Ac , define  a majo  di a e  a : 
 
[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, 
tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal 
wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, 
landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, 
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in 
any part of the United States, which in the 
determination of the President causes damage of 
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major 
disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement 
the efforts and available resources of States, local 
governments, and disaster relief organizations in 
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering 
caused thereby.83 
 
A  one ill no e, an impo an  diffe ence be een an eme genc  
and a majo  di a e  i  ha  [a] di a e  i  an e en  ha  ha  
already caused damage to people or property  even if additional 
damage is continuing.  By contrast, the statutory definition of an 
eme genc  doe  no  eq i e e i ing damage. 84 This distinction 
mean  ha  [g]o e no  and ibal leade  ma , b  a e no  eq i ed 
 
82 Id.  
83 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2018).  
84 Greten, supra note 82, at 493. (emphasis included)  
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to, request and receive an emergency declaration before a major 
di a e  decla a ion. 85 
 Further differences between the two classifications include 
the fact that: (1) The President cannot declare a major disaster 
without a formal request from the Governor of the affected state or 
in the case of tribal land, a formal request from the affected federal 
recognized Indian or Alaska Native Tribe86; (2) the President cannot 
declare a major disaster in regards to non-natural events unless the 
event involves a fire, flood, or explosion87; and (3) a major disaster 
decla a ion a ho i e  he P e iden  o app o e mo e a i ance 
p og am  han eme genc  decla a ion . 88  
 In order to start the disaster declaration process, the Stafford 
Ac  eq i e  ha  [o]nl  he go e no  of a a e o  he chief 
executive of a federally-recognized Indian tribal government may 
request a Presiden ial decla a ion. 89 Within the required 
paperwork, the governor or the American Indian Nation chief 
e ec i e m  f ni h info ma ion on he na e and amo n  of 
state/tribe and local resources that have been or will be committed 
to alleviating the results of the disaster. 90 Additionally, the request 
m  incl de he e ima e  of he amo n  and e e i  of damage  
i h he p ojec ed impac  on he p i a e and p blic ec o , a  ell 
a  an e ima e of he pe and amo n  of a i ance needed nde  
he S affo d Ac . 91  Finall , he S affo d Ac  eq i e  ha  he [ ]he 
request must be based upon a finding that the event is of such 
severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the 
capabilities of the state/tribe and the affected local governments, and 
that federal a i ance i  nece a . 92  It is important to note that 
until recently, American Indian Nations were required to submit 
their formal requests through the governor of the state within which 
the tribal boundaries exist.  This was changed and codified in the 
Stafford Act so that the chief executive of a federally-recognized 
tribe could submit a formal request for declaration just as a governor 
 
85 Id. at 494. 
86 Id. at 495. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 496. 
89 Id. at 497, citing 42 U.S.C. §122 (4)-(6), (12) (Supp. 2015). 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id., citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191(a) (Supp. 2013).  
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of an affected state would.93 However, non-federally recognized 
ibe  a e ill cla ified a  local go e nmen  and require the 
governor of the affected state to actively assist in the application 
process.94 
 Once a formal request has been submitted by the appropriate 
leadership representative, FEMA will then evaluate the request 
using a number of factors.  According to its own regulations, and 
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), the factors 
FEMA uses for major disaster declaration evaluation includes, but 
is not limited to: 
 
[t]he amount and type of damages; the impact of 
damages on affected individuals, the State, and local 
governments; the available resources of the State and 
local governments and other disaster relief 
organizations; the extent and type of insurance in 
effect to cover losses; assistance available from other 
Federal programs and other sources; imminent 
threats to public health and safety; recent disaster 
history in the State; hazard mitigation measures 
taken by the State or local governments, especially 
implementation of measures required as a result of 
previous major disaster declarations; and other 
factors pertinent to a given incident.95 
 
Once FEMA evaluates the request, the agency will then provide a 
written recommendation and analysis which is then delivered to the 
President for authorization as a formal declaration or rejection.  
 Upon fo mal P e iden ial decla a ion of an affec ed a ea  
a  fo  majo  di a e ,  FEMA and he a e o  ibe o k 
together to navigate the daunting task of recovery amid the difficult 
terrain to federal agency bureaucracy. In a Federal Aid process 
already fraught with complexities and obstacles, major disasters 
involving Tribal Nations are even more so.  Some of these 
complications can best be understood by reviewing past events 
affecting tribal communities in Indian Country. 
 
 
93 42 U.S.C. § 5170.  
94 Greten, supra 82, at 503. 
95 44 C.F.R. §206.37(c)(1). 
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IV.  EXAMPLES OF PAST DISASTERS IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 
 
A. Examples of Past Natural Disasters in Indian Country
Mudslide in Oso, Washington 
 
During one of our opening scenarios, we challenged ourselves 
to imagine a quiet spring day in March and the mudslide that soon 
followed.  Regretfully, this academic exercise represented the harsh 
reality encountered by the members of the Sauk-Suiattle Indian 
Tribe (SSIT) of Washington State.  On the morning of March 22, 
2014, deep within the North Cascade Mountains of Washington 
S a e, a de a a ing m d lide eng lfed 49 home , a  e pon ible 
fo  he dea h  of 43 people and de o ed ili  inf a c e  
Without phone or Internet service, tribal government operation 
largely came to a standstill and made the process of initiating 
eme genc  e ice  nea l  impo ible.  96 To compound these 
initial difficulties, the SSIT leadership was further hampered by the 
fact that the loss of State Route 530 forced tribe members to 
comm e 92 mile  each a  o he o n of A ling on using an 
al e na e o e  in o de  o acce  emplo men  obliga ion  and 
medical services.97  In addition to loss of life and property, the 
m d lide  effec  on ibe membe  da -to-day transportation 
expenses proved to be disruptive.  For example, tribe members who 
had already been living well below the poverty line were forced to 
pa  ga oline p ice  a  nea l  $4.00 pe  gallon.  98 
 Shortly after the mudslide devastated their community, 
leaders of the SSIT testified before the Senate Committee of Indian 
Affairs and reported on their difficult experiences with FEMA and 
the deferral disaster responses process. At the hearings,  the SSIT 
leaders recommended that FEMA must: (1) clarify its requirements 
for tribal emergency declarations, (2) improve its coordination with 
Tribes and Charitable Organizations like the Red Cross, and (3) 
assist the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Indian Health Services 
(IHS) in enacting disaster response protocols and make emergency 
 
96 When Catastrophe Strikes: Responses to Natural Disaster in Indian Country: 
Hearing before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) (Statement of 





resources available when needed.99                            
                      
     
 100 
Winter snowstorms in California. In April 2016, the Los Coyotes 
Band of Cahuilla and Cupeño Indians experienced a snowstorm. The 
storm caused over $173,000 in damage and resulted in significant 
loss to the small tribes. Tribal leadership filed for public assistance 
and ha a d mi iga ion b  e e denied b  FEMA.  The T ibe  
eq e  fo  a majo  di a e  decla a ion a  denied ba ed on he 
determination that the damage was not of such severity and 
magnitude as to warrant supplemental federal assistance under the 
S affo d Ac . 101  For a small tribe of 328 enrolled members a storm 
of the scale it faced during that April 2016 storm, the reported 
damages of over $173,252.00 were huge and exemplified the 
diffic l ie  ome ibe  enco n e  h o gh FEMA  di a e  
evaluation process.102 
 Wildfires, drought, landslides, and flooding affecting the 
Santa Clara Pueblo of New Mexico. A third and equally 
 
99 Id.  
100 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-433, EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAJOR DISASTER DECLARATION 
PROCESS FOR FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES (2018), pg. 17 (Although the 
pic e a  aken d ing he Confede a ed T ibe  of Col ille Re e a ion  2013 
flooding event, it vividly demonstrates the bureaucratic quagmire and obstacles 
tribes have encountered when seeking post-disaster relief from the United States 
federal government that SSIT leadership discussed in their Senate testimony.) 
101 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
REPORT LOS COYOTES BAND OF CAHUILLA-CUPEÑO INDIANS  SEVERE WINTER 
STORM AND FLOODING  DENIAL (2016), pg. 2.  




informative example is that of the difficulties faced by the Santa 
Clara Pueblo. When Santa Clara Pueblo Governor J. Michael 
Chavarria testified before the United States Senate in 2017, he 
submitted through a prepared statement that his north-central New 
Me ican ibe had lo  o e  16,000 ac e  of o  fo e land  and 
hen combined i h he land lo  in he O o Comple  Fi e of 
1998 and the Cerro Grande Fire of 2000  has resulted in the 
destruction of 80% of our forests and a huge part of our cultural 
he i age. 103  He al o e ified  ha   [n]one of he fo  fi e  e ha e 
faced in the past decade have originated on our lands, yet we have 
suffered the repeated and severe consequences of these natural 
di a e .   The Go e no  al o info med he legi la i e bod  ha  the 
suffering he referred to took the form of physical damage to the land 
in the form of a 25.9 mile burn scar.104  A burn scar refers to land 
that has been charred and stripped of all vegetation by a wildfire.  
Because the land is devoid of vegetation, no root systems remain in 
place to secure the land.  As a result, the land is vulnerable to flash 
floods and mudslides. Our Pueblo has experienced severe flash 
flooding since the fire.105  
Governor Chavarria concluded his prepared statement by 
making the following five recommendations: (1) the creation of a 
BIA Eme genc  Re pon e F nd o ha  he BIA co ld ha e eadil  
available significant funding that can be deployed as necessary to 
address short- and long-term disaster recovery and disaster 
mi iga ion need ; (2) he e of he FEMA T ibal G idance 
Doc men  o help eflec  he di e e oice  of ibal leade  and 
emergency management officials, among others, and is responsive 
o hei  conce n , ; (3) he con in ed e of he S affo d Ac  h o gh 
the use of maintenance of amendments; (4) the appropriation of 
necessary funds for implementation of Forest treatment as identified 
under the Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA), and (5) additional 




103 E e ge c  Ma age e  i  I dia  C : I i g FEMA  Fede a -
Tribal Relationship with Indian Tribes:  Hearing before the Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (Statement of Hon. J. Michael Chavarria, Governor, 
Pueblo of Santa Clara).  
104 Id. at 16. 
105 Id. at 19.  
106 Id. at 24. 
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B. Examples of Past Man-Made Disasters in Indian Country 
  
We have explored together some the natural disasters that 
have plagued Indian Country over recent years. In addition to the 
natural disasters discussed above, tribes have also encountered 
devastating man-made disasters. As previously discussed, man-
made e en  a e echnicall  ca ego i ed nde  eme genc  a , 
although as the example below will demonstrate, these events are no 
less devastating to those tribes affected by them.   
Gold King Mine Disaster. On August 5, 2015, an 
Environmental Protection Agency contractor attempted to contain a 
leak from the Gold King Mine.  Instead, the contractor ruptured the 
mine  con aining ba ie , elea ing million  of gallon  of 
contaminated water into Cement Creek.107 The con ac o  ing 
hea  machine  p ed he mine  con ainmen  ba ie  elea ing 
millions of gallons of contaminated mine waste into a tributary of 
the Animas River, Cement Creek.  This toxic wastewater containing 
heavy metals such as arsenic, lead, and cadmium flowed from 
Cement Creek into the Animas River, and into the San Juan River 
(hereinafte  SJR ). 108 Delegate Lorenzo Ba e  no ed ha  he 
Navajo Communities along the river have experienced significant 
cultural and economic damages as a result of the spill. Water is 
sacred to the Navajo People; it is the basis of all life. Spiritually and 
culturally Navajo beliefs are deeply connected to the land, air, and 
water that lie between the four sacred mountains that form the 
abo iginal bo nda  of o  land. 109 Most importantly, Delegate 
Ba e  empha i ed ha  [ ]he pill ha  con amina ed o  de o ed 
many of the essential elements of our religious practice, and 
desecrated a river we have treated with reverence since time 
immemo ial. 110   
 Difficulties with the Federal response to the emergency were 
poignantly demonstrated by the 2015 Senate testimony of Navajo 
Nation President Russell Begaye.  He testified that: 
 
107 EPA  G d Ki g Mi e Di a e : E a i i g he Ha f  I ac   I dia  
Country: Hearing before the Comm.  on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(Statement of LoRenzo Bates, Navajo Nation Council Delegate for 
Communities of Nenahnezad, Newcomb, San Juan, Tiis Tsoh Sikaad, 
T e Daa Kaan, and Uppe  F i land). 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
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 Simply, we do not trust the EPA.  Why?  
They did not inform the Nation of the accident until 
two days after the blowout.  I believe the only reason 
they finally informed the Navajo Nation is because 
you cannot hide an accident when the rivers turn 
orange. 
 When we first received notice, they told us it 
was 1 million gallons of contaminants that was 
released from the mine but later, they changed it to 3 
million gallons.  Since then, it has neared 30 million 
gallons. 
 At a public hearing, the USEPA 
representative said the water was churning up at the 
base of the mountain but when the vice president and 
I went to the mouth of the mine to visually 
investigate, we were stunned to see the yellow river. 
 I even showed the USEPA officials a picture 
I had just taken a few hours before of the toxic waters 
that were still pouring out of the mine and it was 
yellow. 
 The last straw was when USEPA gave my 
people 20 million gallon water tanks for relief.  
Those tanks were tainted with oil.  I directly asked 
the USEPA about the tainted tanks.  They 
vehemently denied that they had oily substances in 
them. 
 They said, it is only used for clean drinking 
water but when I personally wen to one tank, put my 
hand into the intake valve of that tank, my hand came 
out blackened with oil.  They expected us to give that 
tainted water to our livestock and crops. 
 Let me again say, the Navajo Nation does not 
trust the USEPA.  We expect them to be held fully 
accountable for what they have done to my people 
and to all people who live along both the San Juan 
and Animas Rivers. 
 I am not just speaking today for my people 
but all peoples whose souls hurting from what should 
have been an avoidable, negligent act.  Today is our 
greatest time of need with our people struggling for 
water for their animals, livestock and irrigation.  The 
USEPA has abandoned us. 
 The water tanks are being pulled out, feed for 
our livestock has stopped.  Last Friday, Ms. 
McCarthy and I spoke on the phone and she was 
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unaware that the USEPA had stopped giving water.  
I did not know that we stopped giving hay. 
 As EPA Administrator, how does she not 
know that this was happening? The orders to leave 
our Nation case from her regional directors.  This just 
adds to the culture of distrust they have created. 
 What my people need first and foremost is 
compensation and need it now.  The farmers have 
spent monies they do not have and are expected to 
purchase materials, haul water and buy hay for their 
livestock. 
 Our farmers and ranchers still need hay and 
water.  EPA has pulled out.  BIA has expended all of 
their funds.  We are now taking monies from our 
emergency account to help our people. 
 I am saying that today I want this Committee 
to stand with us and make sure the EPA pays for what 
it has done to my people, to my Nation.111 
 
P e iden  Bega e  e imon  a f ll  and po e f ll  demon a e  
the sense of powerlessness, abandonment, and betrayal felt by the 
Navajo Nation that he leads. Moreover, his testimony vividly 
highlights the flaws inherent in the disaster response process 
involving American Indian Nations and Tribes.  In particular, 
President Begaye implored Senate committee members to recognize 
that tribes face many legal hurdles when dealing with man-made 
disasters. This is especially true due to the fact that the tribes lack 
the criminal jurisdictional tools (as per Wheeler). Tribes and also 
lack the civil jurisdictional tools (as per Montana) to punish 
contractors like those involved in the Gold King Mine disaster.   
To complicate matters further, the negligence of federal 
government contractors and corporations force tribes to do what 
they can to recover damages. In fact, American Indian Nations are 
of en fo ced o eek onl  ci il emedie  fo  inj  o, de c ion 
of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of 
a e ing ch inj  a  pe  fede al a e  like he Comp ehen i e 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERLA). 112  Theoretically, statutes like CERLA are designed to 
 
111 Id. at 30-31 (Statement of the Hon. Russell Begaye, President of the Navajo 
Nation) (Emphasis added). 
112 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(6), 9607(a)(4), (c).  
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ecogni e he a ho i  of Indian ibe  o commence actions for 
na al e o ce  damage . 113  
However, in practice how likely is it that American Indian 
Nations and Tribes like Navajo Nation will be able to recover 
something from a negligent federal contractor, the EPA, the federal 
government itself, or even private corporations acting negligently in 
Indian County for the damages inflicted upon their natural resources 
by the Gold King Mine disaster?  Regretfully, if the experiences of 
the Alaskan Native Villages following the Exxon Valdez oil tankard 
disaster in 1989 are any indication, the Navajo Tribes will recover 
very little and only after decades of litigation.114  
 When the Exxon Valdez oil tankard ran aground along the 
Bligh Reef of in e io  Ala ka, [e]le en million gallon  of oil pilled 
into the pristine waters of Prince William Sound, and the oil slick 
itself spread over 1000 square miles. Oil soaked or spattered 1200 
miles of coastline, a distance equal to a length of land running from 
Cape Cod to the Outer Banks of North Carolina. Hundreds of miles 
of beaches on federal, state, and municipal land were also covered 
i h oil. 115  Attempting to use the authority under CERCLA and 
the Clean Water Act, the Alaska Native communities sought 
mone a  emedie  fo  c l al damage , in he fo m of bsistence 
damage ,  ha  he  ffe ed. While b i ence  i  adi ionall  
ecogni ed in ca e la  a  impl  meaning a da -to-day utilization 
of game and other resources to provide for nourishment and other 
basic needs.  However, in the context of native cultures, the term has 
a broader and deeper meaning, so that to Alaska Natives, loss of 
natural resources means something more than a simple inability to 
ain he bod  fo  lack of food. 116  As Mary Kanciewick and Eric 
Smi h no ed in hei  a icle, S b istence in Alaska: Towards a 
Na i e P io i , b i ence ha  mo e o do i h men al heal h and 
spiritual well-being han i  doe  i h economic ec i . 117 Even 
more tragic was the fact that state and federal statutes were not 
 
113 Kanner, supra note 74, at 106.  
114 Deborah S. Bardwick, The A e ica  T  S e  Re e  
Environmental Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 19 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 259 (2000). 
115 Id. at 261 (internal citations omitted). 
116 Id. at 280 (internal citations omitted). 
117 Mary Kanciewick & Eric Smith, Subsistence in Alaska: Towards a Native 
Priority, 59 UMKC L. REV. 645, 649 (1991) as cited in Bardwick, supra note 
118, at 280. 
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designed to recognize damage  fo  he b i ence c l e of 
Na i e g o p . 118  The e l  a  ha  Ala ka Na i e  co ld no  
recover for cultural damages to their subsistence way of life. Judge 
Holland  deci ion in he In re The Exxon Valdez and the Ninth 
Ci c i  b eq en  affi ma ion of he di ic  co  deci ion 
confi med ha  eading of he la . 119   
 Regretfully, little has legally changed during the time 
between the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster and the Gold King Mine 
disaster.  Although the Congressional passage of the Oil Pollution 
Ac  of 1990 a e  ha  companie  ho e ope a ion  ma  lead o 
natural resource liability now face a new political willingness and 
onge  la  and eg la ion  o p o ec e he e claim , he cope 
of the new laws are limited and do not address the cultural damages 
suffered by tribes following man-made events like these.120 
 After looking at the past natural and man-made disasters, we 
are left with a variety of pressing questions: What do the future of 
disaster and emergency issues in Indian Country look like?  What 
are some possible solutions? 
 
V.  FUTURE DISASTERS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 
 In addition to natural disasters, it is impossible to ignore the 
likelihood that many different forms of disaster events will pepper 
our future.  In particular, there may exist natural disaster events 
whose origins are man-made such as: (1) disastrous weather 
resulting from climate change, and (2) terrorist acts.  Some of these 
risks can be seen even now.  
 
A. Some Examples of Future Challenges Facing Tribes 
 
1. Climate Change 
  
A current example of the visible effects of climate change is 
exemplified by the plight of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe of 
Louisiana.121 Living on Isle de Jean Charles, the tribe members have 
 
118 Bardwick, supra note 117, at 286. 
119 Id.  
120 Kanner, supra note 76, at 94. 
121 Madaline King, A Tribe Faces Rising Tides: The Resettlement of Isle de Jean 
Charles, 6 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 295 , Mar. 23, 2018, available at 
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seen their 22,400-ac e a ea d op o a me e 320 ac e  oda 122 due 
to flooding and coastal water rising.  Communities like those of the 
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw (BCC) tribe can be found in coastal 
communities lining the shores of the Pacific Northwest in Alaska.  
The legal and statutory tools available to tribal leaders and federal 
agencies appear limited as the waters continue to rise and the 
number of available options disappear. For example, can the tribe 
members be forced to leave?  Should they be forced to leave?   
 In her law review article, recent Louisiana State University 
Law School graduate, Madaline King offers the timely argument 
that even restrained discussion of moving the tribe members can 
only occur after stakeholders can agree on some basic language and 
concep .  The diffe ence  be een eloca ion and e e lemen  
clarify why one concept is preferred over the other. . .. Relocation is 
essentially the ad hoc migration of people. Resettlement is the 
permanent or long-term movement of a community from one site to 
ano he . 123  King gge  ha  eloca ion de o  an  emblance 
of community the residents once had. Such movement is connected 
to a loss of identity. Although residents lose their homes, an even 
bigger price is paid: the loss of social, cultural, and religious aspects 
of he comm ni . 124  In con a , [d] ing e e lemen , he 
essential characteristics of the original community, such as its social 
structures, legal and political systems, culture, and worldviews, are 
p e e ed  The comm ni  main ain  i  ni  in a fo m ha  i  
imila  o he o iginal comm ni . 125 
 Finally, an important consideration regarding the issue of 
relocation and resettlement of an American Indian Nation even 
when involving a climate-related disaster, is that historical and 
cultural contexts are of the utmost importance. In other words, 
asking a tribe like the BCC to relocate can reignite the historical 




t=jelr [https://perma.cc/S9WJ-AFPA].  
122 Id. at 306, citing Carolyn Van Houten, The First Official Climate Refugees in 




123 Id. at 301 (internal citations omitted).  
124 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
125 Id. at 302 (internal citations omitted). 
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policies designed to destroy and eradicate the social structures and 
sovereignty of tribes throughout the nation. Thus, King argues that 
tribal leadership and federal agencies should prioritize the option of 
resettlement instead of relocation. With this as a possibility the 
comm ni  can pla  a majo  ole in deci ion-making regarding 
where the resettlement site will be located, what resources the new 
community will have access to, when the first phases will begin, and 
ho  he plan ill nfold. 126 The resettlement plan can also be used 
o p o ec  ha  i  lef  of Lo i iana  coa line and o c ea e a model 
for other communities that will face similar problem . 127  
 
 2. The Threat of Terrorism in Indian Country 
  
In addition to an increased number of natural disasters, 
whether or not from climate-change, those in Indian Country must 
recognize the dangerous reality of terrorism. Regretfully, current 
federal statutes provide the American Indian Nations and Tribes 
with little in the way of regulatory powers to combat terrorism.  
Even worse is the fact that the failed jurisdictional approach results 
in the increased danger to individual tribe members 
 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 federal 
legislation was passed to provide federal government agencies with 
he mean  o g a an ee he p o ec ion of bo de  pa ol and c i ical 
inf a c e  in hope  of p o ec ing he li e  of Uni ed States 
ci i en . 128 The main legislative vehicle for providing this 
protection came in the form of the passage of the Homeland Security 
Act129 and the United and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
(USA PATRIOT Act).130  Each statute was designed so that by 
making i  mo e diffic l  o ge  a pa po  in o he co n  and pa  
through airport security, the country is under the impression that it 
i  afe and ha  he e i  no hing lef  o fea . 131 However, there 
 
126 Id. at 314.  
127 Id. at 313. 
128 Jennifer Butts, Victims in Waiting: How the Homeland Security Act Falls 
Short of Fully Protecting Tribal Lands, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 373, 374, 
(2004). 
129 Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
130 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001).  
131 Butts, supra note 130, at 374.  
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remain significant flaws in the protection of critical infrastructure, 
especially infrastructure located in Indian Country.  For example, 
he G and Co lee Dam on he Col ille e e a ion, hich i  he 
largest producer of hydroelectric power in the United States, and the 
third-largest in the world.  Also present are nuclear power facilities, 
power grids, military supply manufacturers, and transportation 
o e . 132   
 The precarious nature of Homeland Security in Indian 
Country often results in jurisdictional chaos, especially when it 
comes to criminal jurisdiction. For example, the Navajo Nation 
struggled to punish the contractor involved in the Gold King Mine 
disaster for the same reason  jurisdictional chaos, especially in the 
form of criminal jurisdiction.  As previously discussed in Part I of 
this paper, the Supreme Court ruling in Oliphant established that 
ibal co  do no  ha e c iminal j i dic ion o e  non-Indians 
because Congress had not affirmatively granted that power by treaty 
o  a e. 133 The Co  ea oned ha  Cong e  m  p o ec  i  
citizens from infringement on their personal liberties.  To allow 
United States citizens (non-Indians) to be subject to another judicial 
system would violate congressional responsibility over United 
S a e  ci i en . 134  The limitations created by the Oliphant opinion 
regarding tribal court criminal jurisdiction were compounded by 
certain aspects of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  With the 
statutory creation of the Department of Homeland Security, tribal 
sovereignty was further intruded upon in a variety of ways. 
 This first example is how the Homeland Security Act 
statutorily defines terrorism and to whom the acts of terrorism apply.  
It defines terrorism as: 
 
[A]ny activity that (A) involves an act that (i) is 
dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of 
critical infrastructure or key resources, and (ii) is a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or 
any state or other subdivision of the United States; 
and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
 
132 Id. at 375. 
133 Id. at 378, citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203-04 
(1978). 
134 Id.  
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or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.135 
 
In addition to statutorily defining terrorism, the Homeland Security 
Act clarifies the protections and safeguards it provides.  As per the 
Homeland Security Act, the local government is defined as: 
 
 (A) a county, municipality, city, town, 
township, local public authority, school district, 
special district, intrastate district, council of 
governments (regardless of whether the council of 
governments is incorporated as a nonprofit 
corporation under State law), regional or interstate 
government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a 
local government; 
 (B) an Indian tribe or authorized tribal 
organization, or in Alaska a Native village or Alaska 
Regional Native Corporation; and 
 (C) a rural community, unincorporated town 
or village, or other public entity.136 
 
The Homeland Sec i  Ac  emb ace  he no ion of fede ali m b  
empo e ing he local go e nmen 137 beca e i  e pec  and 
acknowledges the importance of local law enforcement, emergency 
e pon e p o ide , and ocial e ice agencie . 138  However, at the 
same time, the treatment and definition of American Indian Nations 
and T ibe  a  local go e nmen  eemingl  igno e  he doc ine  
of tribal sovereignty and domestic dependent status established in 
he Ma hall ilog . 139  
 The second example of how the Homeland Security Act 
intrudes upon tribal sovereignty is demonstrated by the lack of a 
working relationship between the federal government.140 Often, as 
he e pe ience  of he Chippe a C ee T ibe highligh , [a] look a  
the amount of money already allotted to tribes for homeland security 
indicates the nonexistent government-to-government 
 
135 Id. at 381, citing Homeland Security Act § 2(15), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 
Stat. 2135 (2002) (emphasis added). 
136 Id.  
137 Butts, supra note 130, at 381.   
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 387. 
140 Id.  
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ela ion hip. 141 To illustrate this point, of the $9,000,000 the State 
of North Dakota received from the Department of Homeland 
Security, [o]nly $75,000 was earmarked for all Indian tribes in the 
state.142 Wi h facili ie  ch a  he Min eman la nch i e and 
Garrison dam present in the state, this does not seem to be enough 
to effectively prevent and respond to a terrorist attack.  And to make 
matters worse, the state of North Dakota never consulted tribes 
when determining the homeland security needs within Indian 
Co n . 143    
 Other potential avenues of terrorism.  Other means by 
which terrorists can target people are through 1) agroterrorism and 
2) bioterrorism. Both are potential disasters and emergencies that 
citizens and their leadership must acknowledge is possible, even in 
Indian Country.  Again, with each as in that of infrastructure targeted 
terrorism, issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty abound. 
 As early as December 2004, outgoing Secretary of Health 
and H man Se ice , e p e ed hi  conce n ha  he na ion  food 
supply would be considered a particularly inviting target.  In fact, 
d ing hi  fa e ell add e , Sec e a  Tomm  Thomp on a ed, I, 
for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not . . . 
attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.  And we are 
importing a lot of food from the Middle East, and it would be easy 
o ampe  i h ha . 144 Ag o e o i m i  he delibe a e 
introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating 
fear over the safety of food, causing economic losses, and/or 
nde mining ocial abili . 145   
Agroterrorism can be initiated in one of two ways.  As a 
result, it is particularly difficult to combat.  The two methods of 
attack come in the form of 1) deliberately infecting the food item 
 
141 Id. at 388. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. citing Alvin Windy Boy, Chairman, Chippewa Cree Business Committee 
in Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002:  
Hearing on S. 578 Before the Senate Comm. On Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 
(2003), available at 
http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/073003pmhrg/Inouye.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/H7JK-TFVJ]. 
144 Erick Rhoam, What Congress Gives, Congress Takes Away: Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity and the Threat of Agroterrorism, 19 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 137 
(2009), citing William Branigin, et.al., Tommy Thompson Resigns From HHS, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004. 
145 Id. at 140, citing Jim Monke, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1 (2007).  
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before importing it into the United States, or 2) an individual or 
terrorist cell can enter the United States and deliberately infect the 
food supply chain from within the country.146 Whether by 
deliberately infecting a food item from abroad or at home, terrorists 
could successfully wreak havoc upon the national psyche and sense 
of security.  American Indian Nations and Tribes are essential links 
in he na ional food ppl  chain beca e ag ic l e i  Indian 
Co n  econd-la ge  emplo e 147 a  [ ]e e al ibe  o n 
fa m  and p od ce food ha  en e  he na ion  food ppl . 148 To 
demon a e hi  in e ac ion, [a] 2003 Food Safe  B iefing, gi en 
by the Indian Health Service noted there are 4,068 tribal food service 
e abli hmen  ope a ed b  334 ibe . 149   
 Additionally, many tribes are located on the border of either 
Me ico o  Canada.  The e l ing p oblem  in ol e j i dic ional 
i e , and la  enfo cemen  a ho i  o handle a p oblem on 
Indian land can change acco ding o he ci il/c iminal na e of he 
offense, the seriousness of the offense, the tribal status of those 
in ol ed, and he a e in hich he offen e i  commi ed. 150  The 
e l  i  ha  [ ]he e en anglemen  make illegal mig a ion in o he 
United States easier because Indian tribes do not coordinate well, if 
at all, with border patrol.  Compounding the problem is the 
friendliness shown by Indian tribes to illegal immigrants because 
they are more gracious than the Border Patrol agents.  An 
agroterrorism attack originating from Indian land, via a successful 
border penetration, is a serious conce n. 151 
 Once an act of agroterrorism or bioterrorism begins to 
involve tribe members, what tools and resources are available for 
T ibe  o e o add e  he g o ing eme genc ?  A hif ing and 
complex body of law controls jurisdiction on Indian lands.  This 
leaves many open questions regarding the scope of tribal and state 
a ho i  o eg la e and e pond o h ea  o p blic heal h. 152  
 
146 Id. at 142. 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 144, citing INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, TRIBAL FOOD SAFETY ISSUES BY 
THE NUMBERS (2003). 
150 Id. at 144 (internal citations omitted). 
151 Id. at 144-45. 
152 Justin B. Barnard, Responding to Public Health Emergencies on Tribal 
Lands: Jurisdictional Challenges and Practical Solutions, 15 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL Y, L. & ETHICS 251, 254 (Summer 2015), available at 
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Traditional methods of addressing the emergency often involve 
q a an ine and i ola ion o  o he  me hod  of ocial di ancing. 153 
Other tools available to the state or local health officials and 
agencies include: (1) identifying and treating infected individuals;154 
(2) secure and separate personal and real property like livestock and 
domestic animals;155 and (3) utilize investigative powers that may 
incl de he po e  o en e  and in pec  p i a e p ope , and ma  
include other administrative investigation powers such as the ability 
o bpoena indi id al  and doc men .156  However, should a 
terrorist attack befall a tribe, whether bioterrorism or agroterrorism 
in nature, it would be challenging to initiate the traditional 
techniques of addressing the emergency.   
 In other words, relying upon the traditional techniques of 
add e ing an eme genc  i  p oblema ic beca e [t]he coercive 
nature of these measures, coupled with the jurisdictional 
uncertainty. . . underscores the need for tribal and state governments 
to work together.  It is important to ensure that the government entity 
implementing a particular response to a public health threat does so 
with a mantle of legitimacy and the support of its neighboring 
o e eign. 157 In the end, when dealing with public health 
eme gencie  in Indian Co n , no ma e  he ca e, [f]ede al and 
state laws generate, rather than answer, questions as to who has 
jurisdiction to pursue emergency response measures in areas that are 
likel  o be of conce n o a e p blic heal h official . 158  In his 
a icle, Re ponding o P blic Heal h Eme gencie  on T ibal Land : 
Jurisdictional Challenges and P ac ical Sol ion ,  a ho  J in B. 
Barnard, Esq., put it best when he noted that: 
 
Given the coercive nature of many public health 
emergency measures which may require holding 
individuals against their will, entering or destroying 
property, or closing down public spaces and 
businesses the perceived legitimacy and 
acceptance of the implemen ing go e nmen  
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authority seems especially critical to the success of 
the response. Indeed, disputes over tribal sovereignty 
have ended in armed stand-offs between tribal 
members and the local, state, and federal government 
officials.159 
 
B. The Importance of Tribes Being Prepared and Active in Trying 
to Influence Federal Policy Formation 
  
What can American Indian Nations and Tribes do when 
confronted with the jurisdictional hurdles and intrusions that occur 
during and after a disaster or emergency, no matter what the cause 
may be?  There are three possible solutions to address some of the 
global  j i dic ional conce n  ha  ill omeda  affec  mo  ibe  
during a disaster or emergency.   
 First, it is vital that Tribes do what they can to develop 
in e go e nmen al ag eemen  (IGA) i h neighbo ing 
governmental entities in the form of state, county, and municipal 
agencie  and o gani a ion .  An IGA i  an ag eemen  o  
memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiated between a tribe 
and a neighboring government to clarify some aspect of their legal 
relationship. In some case, these agreements permit cooperation and 
ha ing of e o ce . 160   The e l  of an ag eemen , in i ed 
before an active emergency, would establish and specify roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities to which the involved governments 
co ld ag ee. 161 In establishing and specifying roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities, the parties of the agreement also 
cla if  he applica ion of b oad and nce ain j i dic ional 
principles in very specific contexts likely to arise in a public health 
eme genc . 162 Mo  impo an l , j  he p oce  of nego ia ion 
may foster a cooperative relationship between tribal and state or 
local governments that the involved governments can codify in an 
IGA o  pledge of m al a i ance. 163 
 Next, it is equally important for legal professionals who are 
entrusted with assisting the American Indian Nations during this 
preparation process to make themselves and their Tribal clients 
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aware of the applicable statutory processes during and after a 
disaster or emergency occurs in Indian Country. For instance, in the 
case of FEMA disaster recovery and assistance, tribes can take 
proactive steps that will pay in time, money, and expenditure of 
resources during a disaster. One such step includes communities 
p e-q alif ing  deb i  emo al con ac o , o  con ac o  fo  
other emergency work that is commonly required, before an event 
and solicit bid prices from this list of contractors once an event has 
occurred. This method allows competitive bidding while preserving 
the ability to achieve reasonable market prices at the time the work 
i  pe fo med. 164  In other words, by planning ahead, the tribe is 
more likely to develop a more viable and economical budget plan 
rather than risk higher costs that might result from limited post-
di a e  e o ce  and he en ing i k fo  p ice-go ging  f om 
vendors and contractors. Another pre-disaster preparation tool, 
ibe  can ili e a e he e abli hmen  of m al aid ag eemen  
before disaster strikes, and to address the subject of reimbursement 
in hei  i en m al aid ag eemen . 165 Another example of how 
a o ne  can help hei  ibal clien  i  ha  b  o k[ing] i h hei  
clients to formally adopt, a local code or ordinance that giver local 
government officials the responsibility to enter private property to 
remove disaster-related debris or perform work in the presence of 
an immedia e h ea . 166  Addi ionall , he [a] o ne  ho ld en e 
that their clients comply with requirements and permits for debris 
operations.  For example, staging and disposal sites should be a safe 
distance from property boundaries, wetlands, surface water, 
structures, wells, septic fields, and endangered species, and 
appropriate sites should be identified for the disposal of hazardous 
ma e ial . 167  While not an exhaustive list of pre-disaster legal 
tasks, this list shows a glimpse of some of the expectations that 
federal agencies like FEMA will expect of those within Indian 
Country during and following a disaster or emergency declaration.   
 The third proposed solution for American Indian Nations 
and Tribes to consider is to maintain constant communication and 
involvement in the continued formation of federal disaster relief and 
recovery policy with the knowledge that by doing so, the voices of 
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tribal citizens cannot be ignored.  In particular, it would benefit all 
tribes to unite and force federal agencies and officials to understand 
that: 
Tribes have not been invited to testify at other 
congressional committees regarding disasters and 
emergency preparedness and when FEMA testifies 
before other committees we do not hear tribal issues 
being highlighted or even mentioned.  We hope 
members of the Committee will assist in ensuring 
that tribes will be included in all hearings regarding 
this important topic. 
 We urge the Committee to request the 
Congressional Research Service to report on the 
possible legislative actions related to tribal 
emergency management that Congress should 
consider.  Specifically, the CRS should evaluate the 
Stafford Act and the Sandy Recovery and 
Improvement Act and recommend changes for tribal 
participation and consider whether separate tribal 
disaster laws are needed.168 
 
This request for active participation in policy formation is important 
to follow-up because it is evident that many of the solutions to the 
jurisdictional issues facing Indian Nation go through Washington 
D.C. and either Congress or the Supreme Court. A continued 
disconnect and/or hostility between American Indian Nations and 
the federal government will continue to result in the further 
marginalization of American Indian Nations and their citizens at 
times of disaster, man-made or natural.  This counter-productive 
relegation of sovereignty risks coming at times when tribes and their 
members could least afford.  In the end, it is up to Indian Country to 
demand a voice in legislative vehicles to forward tribal sovereignty 
or to fight in the Supreme Court for judicial interpretations 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
  
Jurisdictional issues and complications hang over each tribe 
adding weight and force to already life-changing events, no matter 
he i a ion. The b ea c a ic no-man land  hich of en ap 
tribe members and the tribal leadership that serve them make  
natural or man-made  disasters and emergencies extremely 
difficult for tribal authorities to address. Difficulties range from the 
intricacies of federal Indian law, lack of coordination between 
federal, state and tribal agencies, and lack of shared vision for 
preparedness and prevention. Whether we imagine ourselves: as a 
person suffering from the effects of a Washington State mudslide, a 
Southern Californian surviving a severe winter storm, a tribe 
member in the wildfire-scarred mountains of North-Central New 
Mexico,  a grandfather on the banks of his ancestral lands on the 
shore of the San Juan River, a Louisiana tribe member suffering the 
effects of climate-change-induced shoreline flooding and erosion, or 
a cattle rancher whose livestock is effected by agroterrorism and/or 
bioterrorism, we must recognize that only through the cooperation 
of the federal, state, and tribal governments can each tribe and tribe 
member navigate the complexities facing them in times of disaster. 
In the end, we must all prepare and take the necessary steps to avoid 
the ill-fated future that Chief Flying Hawk warned those willing to 
listen when he said: nobod  can be in good heal h if he doe  no  
ha e all he ime f e h ai , n hine, and good a e . 169  
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